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Abstract
Is Android malware classification a solved problem? Pub-
lished F1 scores of up to 0.99 appear to leave very little room
for improvement. In this paper, we argue that results are com-
monly inflated due to two pervasive sources of experimental
bias: spatial bias caused by distributions of training and test-
ing data that are not representative of a real-world deployment;
and temporal bias caused by incorrect time splits of training
and testing sets, leading to impossible configurations. We
propose a set of space and time constraints for experiment de-
sign that eliminates both sources of bias. We introduce a new
metric that summarizes the expected robustness of a classifier
in a real-world setting, and we present an algorithm to tune
its performance. Finally, we demonstrate how this allows us
to evaluate mitigation strategies for time decay such as active
learning. We have implemented our solutions in TESSERACT,
an open source evaluation framework for comparing mal-
ware classifiers in a realistic setting. We used TESSERACT
to evaluate three Android malware classifiers from the liter-
ature on a dataset of 129K applications spanning over three
years. Our evaluation confirms that earlier published results
are biased, while also revealing counter-intuitive performance
and showing that appropriate tuning can lead to significant
improvements.
1 Introduction
Machine learning has become a standard tool for malware re-
search in the academic security community: it has been used
in a wide range of domains including Windows malware [12,
34, 51], PDF malware [27, 32], malicious URLs [28, 48], ma-
licious JavaScript [11, 43], and Android malware [4, 22, 33].
With tantalizingly high performance figures, it seems malware
should be a problem of the past.
Malware classifiers operate in dynamic contexts. As mal-
ware evolves and new variants and families appear over time,
prediction quality decays [26]. Therefore, temporal consis-
tency matters for evaluating the effectiveness of a classifier.
*Equal contribution.
When the experimental setup allows a classifier to train on
what is effectively future knowledge, the reported results be-
come biased [2, 36].
This issue is widespread in the security community and
affects multiple security domains. In this paper, we focus on
Android malware and claim that there is an endemic issue
in that Android malware classifiers [4, 13, 18, 22, 33, 49, 56,
57] (including our own work) are not evaluated in settings
representative of real-world deployments. We choose Android
because of the availability of (a) a public, large-scale, and
timestamped dataset (AndroZoo [3]) and (b) algorithms that
are feasible to reproduce (where all [33] or part [4] of the
code has been released).
We identify experimental bias in two dimensions, space and
time. Spatial bias refers to unrealistic assumptions about the
ratio of goodware to malware in the data. The ratio of good-
ware to malware is domain-specific, but it must be enforced
consistently during the testing phase to mimic a realistic sce-
nario. For example, measurement studies on Android suggest
that most apps in the wild are goodware [21, 30], whereas
for (desktop) software download events most URLs are mali-
cious [31,41]. Temporal bias refers to temporally inconsistent
evaluations which integrate future knowledge about the test-
ing objects into the training phase [2, 36] or create unrealistic
settings. This problem is exacerbated by families of closely
related malware, where including even one variant in the train-
ing set may allow the algorithm to identify many variants in
the testing.
We believe that the pervasiveness of these issues is due to
two main reasons: first, possible sources of evaluation bias are
not common knowledge; second, accounting for time com-
plicates the evaluation and does not allow a comparison to
other approaches using headline evaluation metrics such as
the F1-Score or AUROC. We address these issues in this paper
by systematizing evaluation bias for Android malware classi-
fication and providing new constraints for sound experiment
design along with new metrics and tool support.
Prior work has investigated challenges and experimental
bias in security evaluations [2,5,36,44,47,54]. The base-rate
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fallacy [5] describes how evaluation metrics such as TPR and
FPR are misleading in intrusion detection, due to significant
class imbalance (most traffic is benign); in contrast, we iden-
tify and address experimental settings that give misleading
results regardless of the adopted metrics—even when correct
metrics are reported. Sommer and Paxson [47], Rossow et
al. [44], and van der Kouwe et al. [54] discuss possible guide-
lines for sound security evaluations; but none of these works
identify temporal and spatial bias, nor do they quantify the
impact of errors on classifier performance. Allix et al. [2]
and Miller et al. [36] identify an initial temporal constraint in
Android malware classification, but we show that even results
of recent work following their guidelines (e.g., [33]) suffer
from other temporal and spatial bias (§4.4). To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to identify and address these
sources of bias with novel, actionable constraints, metrics,
and tool support (§4).
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We identify temporal bias associated with incorrect train-
test splits (§3.2) and spatial bias related to unrealistic
assumptions in dataset distribution (§3.3). We experi-
mentally verify on a dataset of 129K apps (with 10% mal-
ware) that, due to bias, performance can decrease up to
50% in practice (§3.1) in two well-known Android mal-
ware classifiers, DREBIN [4] and MAMADROID [33],
which we refer to as ALG1 and ALG2, respectively.
• We propose novel building blocks for more robust eval-
uations of malware classifiers: a set of spatio-temporal
constraints to be enforced in experimental settings (§4.1);
a new metric, AUT, that captures a classifier’s robust-
ness to time decay in a single number and allows for
the fair comparison of different algorithms (§4.2); and
a novel tuning algorithm that empirically optimizes the
classification performance, when malware represents the
minority class (§4.3). We compare the performance of
ALG1 [4], ALG2 [33] and DL [22] (a deep learning-
based approach), and show how removing bias can pro-
vide counter-intuitive results on real performance (§4.4).
• We implement and publicly release the code of our
methodology (§4), TESSERACT, and we further demon-
strate how our findings can be used to evaluate
performance-cost trade-offs of solutions to mitigate time
decay such as active learning (§5).
TESSERACT can assist the research community in pro-
ducing comparable results, revealing counter-intuitive perfor-
mance, and assessing a classifier’s prediction qualities in an
industrial deployment (§6).
We believe that our methodology also creates an opportu-
nity to evaluate the extent to which spatio-temporal experi-
mental bias affects security domains other than Android mal-
ware, and we encourage the security community to embrace
its underpinning philosophy.
Use of the term “bias”: We use (experimental) bias to
refer to the details of an experimental setting that depart from
the conditions in a real-world deployment and can have a
misleading impact (bias) on evaluations. We do not intend
it to relate to the classifier bias/variance trade-off [8] from
traditional machine learning terminology.
2 Android Malware Classification
We focus on Android malware classification. In §2.1 we intro-
duce the reference approaches evaluated, in §2.2 we discuss
the domain-specific prevalence of malware, and in §2.3 we
introduce the dataset used throughout the paper.
2.1 Reference Algorithms
To assess experimental bias (§3), we consider two high-profile
machine learning-driven techniques for Android malware clas-
sification, both published recently in top-tier security confer-
ences. The first approach is ALG1 [4], a linear support vector
machine (SVM) on high-dimensional binary feature vectors
engineered with a lightweight static analysis. The second
approach is ALG2 [33], a Random Forest (RF) applied to fea-
tures engineered by modeling caller-callee relationships over
Android API methods as Markov chains. We choose ALG1
and ALG2 as they build on different types of static analy-
sis to generate feature spaces capturing Android application
characteristics at different levels of abstraction; furthermore,
they use different machine learning algorithms to learn de-
cision boundaries between benign and malicious Android
apps in the given feature space. Thus, they represent a broad
design space and support the generality of our methodology
for characterizing experimental bias. For a sound experimen-
tal baseline, we reimplemented ALG1 following the detailed
description in the paper; for ALG2, we relied on the imple-
mentation provided by its authors. We replicated the baseline
results for both approaches. After identifying and quantifying
the impact of experimental bias (§3), we propose specific con-
straints and metrics to allow fair and unbiased comparisons
(§4). Since ALG1 and ALG2 adopt traditional ML algorithms,
in §4 we also consider DL [22], a deep learning-based ap-
proach that takes as input the same features as ALG1 [4]. We
include DL because the latent feature space of deep learning
approaches can capture different representations of the input
data [19], which may affect their robustness to time decay.
We replicate the baseline results for DL reported in [22] by
re-implementing its neural network architecture and by using
the same input features as for ALG1.
It speaks to the scientific standards of these papers that
we were able to replicate the experiments; indeed, we would
like to emphasize that we do not criticize them specifically.
We use these approaches for our evaluation because they are
available and offer stable baselines.
We report details on the hyperparameters of the reimple-
mented algorithms in §A.1.
2.2 Estimating in-the-wild Malware Ratio
The proportion of malware in the dataset can greatly affect
the performance of the classifier (§3). Hence, unbiased experi-
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ments require a dataset with a realistic percentage of malware
over goodware; on an already existing dataset, one may en-
force such a ratio by, for instance, downsampling the majority
class (§3.3). Each malware domain has its own, often unique,
ratio of malware to goodware typically encountered in the
wild. First, it is important to know if malware is a minority,
majority, or an equal-size class as goodware. For example,
malware is the minority class in network traffic [5] and An-
droid [30], but it is the majority class in binary download
events [41]. On the one hand, the estimation of the percentage
of malware in the wild for a given domain is a non-trivial task.
On the other hand, measurement papers, industry telemetry,
and publicly-available reports may all be leveraged to obtain
realistic estimates.
In the Android landscape, malware represents 6%–18.8%
of all the apps, according to different sources: a key indus-
trial player1 reported the ratio as approximately 6%, whereas
the AndRadar measurement study [30] reports around 8% of
Android malware in the wild. The 2017 Google’s Android
security report [21] suggests 6–10% malware, whereas an
analysis of the metadata of the AndroZoo dataset [3] totaling
almost 8M Android apps updated regularly, reveals an inci-
dence of 18.8% of malicious apps. The data suggests that, in
the Android domain, malware is the minority class. In this
work, we decide to stabilize its percentage to 10% (a de-facto
average across the various estimates), with per-month values
between 8% and 12%. Settling on an average overall ratio of
10% Android malware also allows us to collect a dataset with
a statistically sound number of per-month malware. An ag-
gressive undersampling would have decreased the statistical
significance of the dataset, whereas oversampling goodware
would have been too resource intensive (§2.3).
2.3 Dataset
We consider samples from the public AndroZoo [3] dataset,
consisting of more than 8.5 million Android apps between
2010 and early 2019: each app is associated with a times-
tamp, and most apps include VirusTotal metadata results.
The dataset is constantly updated by crawling from differ-
ent markets (e.g., more than 4 million apps from Google Play
Store, and the remaining from markets such as Anzhi and
AppChina). We choose to refer to this dataset due to its size
and timespan, which allow us to perform realistic space- and
time-aware experiments.
Goodware and malware. AndroZoo’s metadata reports
the number p of positive anti-virus reports on VirusTotal [20]
for applications in the AndroZoo dataset. We chose p = 0 for
goodware and p≥ 4 for malware, following Miller et al.’s [36]
advice for a reliable ground-truth. About 13% of AndroZoo
apps can be called grayware as they have 0 < p < 4. We
exclude grayware from the sampling as including it as either
goodware or malware could disadvantage classifiers whose
features were designed with a different labeling threshold.
1Information obtained through confidential emails with the authors.
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Figure 1: Details of the dataset considered throughout this
paper. The figure reports a stack histogram with the monthly
distribution of apps we collect from AndroZoo: 129,728 An-
droid applications (with average 10% malware), spanning
from Jan 2014 to Dec 2016. The vertical dotted line denotes
the split we use in all time-aware experiments in this paper
(see §4 and §5): training on 2014, testing on 2015 and 2016.
Choosing apps. The number of objects we consider in our
study is affected by the feature extraction cost, and partly
by storage space requirements (as the full AndroZoo dataset,
at the time of writing, is more than 50TB of apps to which
one must add the space required for extracting features). Ex-
tracting features for the whole AndroZoo dataset may take
up to three years on our research infrastructure (three high-
spec Dell PowerEdge R730 nodes, each with 2 x 14 cores in
hyperthreading—in total, 168 vCPU threads, 1.2TB of RAM,
and a 100TB NAS), thus we decided to extract features from
129K apps (§2.2). We believe this represents a large dataset
with enough statistical significance. To evaluate time decay,
we decide on a granularity of one month, and we uniformly
sample 129K AndroZoo apps in the period from Jan 2014 to
Dec 2016, but also enforce an overall average of 10% mal-
ware (see §2.2)–with an allowed percentage of malware per
month between 8% and 12%, to ensure some variability. Span-
ning over three years ensures 1,000+ apps per month (except
for the last three months, where AndroZoo had crawled less
applications). We consider apps up to Dec 2016 because the
VirusTotal results for 2017 and 2018 apps were mostly un-
available from AndroZoo at the time of writing; moreover,
Miller et al. [36] empirically evaluated that antivirus detec-
tions become stable after approximately one year—choosing
Dec 2016 as the finishing time ensures good ground-truth
confidence in objects labeled as malware.
Dataset summary. The final dataset consists of 129,728
Android applications (116,993 goodware and 12,735 mal-
ware). Figure 1 reports a stack histogram showing the per-
month distribution of goodware/malware in the dataset. For
the sake of clarity, the figure also reports the number of mal-
ware and goodware in each bin. The training and testing splits
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used in §3 are reported in Table 1; all the time-aware experi-
ments in the remainder of this paper are performed by training
on 2014 and testing on 2015 and 2016 (see the vertical dotted
line in Figure 1).
3 Sources of Experimental Bias
In this section, we motivate our discussion of bias through
experimentation with ALG1 [4] and ALG2 [33] (§3.1). We
then detail the sources of temporal (§3.2) and spatial bias
(§3.3) that affect ML-based Android malware classification.
3.1 Motivational Example
We consider a motivational example in which we vary the
sources of experimental bias to better illustrate the problem.
Table 1 reports the F1-score for ALG1 and ALG2 under vari-
ous experimental configurations; rows correspond to different
sources of temporal experimental bias, and columns corre-
spond to different sources of spatial experimental bias. On
the left-part of Table 1, we use squares (/) to show from
which time frame training and testing objects are taken; each
square represents six months (in the window from Jan 2014 to
Dec 2016). Black squares () denote that samples are taken
from that six-month time frame, whereas periods with gray
squares () are not used. The columns on the right part of the
table correspond to different percentages of malware in the
training set Tr and the testing set T s.
Table 1 shows that both ALG1 and ALG2 perform far worse
in realistic settings (bold values with green background in
the last row, for columns corresponding to 10% malware in
testing) than in settings similar to those presented in [4, 33]
(bold values with red background). This is due to inadvertent
experimental bias as outlined in the following.
Note. We clarify to which similar settings of [4, 33] we re-
fer to in the cells with red background in Table 1. The paper of
ALG2 [33] reports in the abstract performance “up to 99% F1”,
which (out of the many settings they evaluate) corresponds
to a scenario with 86% malware in both training and test-
ing, evaluated with 10-fold CV; here, we rounded off to 90%
malware for a cleaner presentation (we have experimentally
verified that results with 86% and 90% malware-to-benign
class ratio are similar). ALG1’s original paper [4] relies on
hold-out by performing 10 random splits (66% training and
33% testing). Since hold-out is almost equivalent to k-fold CV
and suffers from the same spatio-temporal biases, for the sake
of simplicity in this section we refer to a k-fold CV setting
for both ALG1 and ALG2.
3.2 Temporal Experimental Bias
Concept drift is a problem that occurs in machine learning
when a model becomes obsolete as the distribution of incom-
ing data at test-time differs from that of training data, i.e.,
when the assumption does not hold that data is independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) [26]. In the ML community,
this problem is also known as dataset shift [50]. Time decay
is the decrease in model performance over time caused by
concept drift.
Concept drift in malware combined with similarities among
malware within the same family causes k-fold cross validation
(CV) to be positively biased, artificially inflating the perfor-
mance of malware classifiers [2,36,37]. K-fold CV is likely to
include in the training set at least one sample of each malware
family in the dataset, whereas new families will be unknown
at training time in a real-world deployment. The all-black
squares in Table 1 for 10-fold CV refer to each training/testing
fold of the 10 iterations containing at least one sample from
each time frame. The use of k-fold CV is widespread in mal-
ware classification research [11,12,27,31,34,37,41,49,51,57];
while a useful mechanism to prevent overfitting [8] or esti-
mate the performance of a classifier in the absence of concept
drift when the i.i.d. assumption holds (see considerations in
§4.4), it has been unclear how it affects the real-world perfor-
mance of machine learning techniques with non-stationary
data that are affected by time decay. Here, in the first row of
Table 1, we quantify the performance impact in the Android
domain.
The second row of Table 1 reports an experiment in which
a classifier’s ability to detect past objects is evaluated [2, 33].
Although this characteristic is important, high performance
should be expected from a classifier in such a scenario: if the
classifier contains at least one variant of a past malware family,
it will likely identify similar variants. We thus believe that
experiments on the performance achieved on the detection of
past malware can be misleading; the community should focus
on building malware classifiers that are robust against time
decay.
In the third row, we identify a novel temporal bias that
occurs when goodware and malware correspond to different
time periods, often due to having originated from different
data sources (e.g., in [33]). The black and gray squares in
Table 1 show that, although malware testing objects are poste-
rior to malware training objects, the goodware/malware time
windows do not overlap; in this case, the classifier may learn
to distinguish applications from different time periods, rather
than goodware from malware—again leading to artificially
high performance. For instance, spurious features such as
new API methods may be able to strongly distinguish objects
simply because malicious applications predate that API.
The last row of Table 1 shows that the realistic setting,
where training is temporally precedent to testing, causes the
worst classifier performance in the majority of cases. We
present decay plots and a more detailed discussion in §4.
3.3 Spatial Experimental Bias
We identify two main types of spatial experimental bias based
on assumptions on percentages of malware in testing and
training sets. All experiments in this section assume temporal
consistency. The model is trained on 2014 and tested on 2015
and 2016 (last row of Table 1) to allow the analysis of spatial
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% mw in testing set Ts
10% (realistic) 90% (unrealistic)
% mw in training set Tr % mw in training set Tr
Sample dates 10% 90% 10% 90% 10% 90% 10% 90%
Experimental setting Training Testing ALG1 [4] ALG2 [33] ALG1 [4] ALG2 [33]
10-fold CV gw:  gw:  0.56 0.83 0.32 0.94 0.98 0.85
mw:  mw:  0.91 0.97
Temporally inconsistent gw:  gw:  0.76 0.42 0.49 0.21 0.86 0.93 0.54
mw:  mw:  0.95
Temporally inconsistent gw:  gw:  0.77 0.70 0.65 0.56 0.79 0.94 0.65gw/mw windows mw:  mw:  0.93
Temporally consistent gw:  gw:  0.62 0.94 0.33 0.96(realistic) mw:  mw:  0.58 0.45 0.32 0.30
Table 1: F1-Score results that show impact of spatial (in columns) and temporal (in rows) experimental bias. Values with red
backgrounds are experimental results of (unrealistic) settings similar to those considered in papers of ALG1 [4] and ALG2 [33];
values with green background (last row) are results in the realistic settings we identify. The dataset consists of three years (§2.3),
and each square on the left part of the table represents a six month time-frame: if training (resp. testing) objects are sampled from
that time frame, we use a black square (); if not, we use a gray square ().
bias without the interference of temporal bias.
Spatial experimental bias in testing. The percentage of
malware in the testing distribution needs to be estimated
(§2.2) and cannot be changed, if one wants results to be repre-
sentative of in-the-wild deployment of the malware classifier.
To understand why this leads to biased results, we artificially
vary the testing distribution to illustrate our point. Figure 2
reports performance (F1-Score, Precision, Recall) for increas-
ing the percentage of malware during testing on the X-axis.
We change the percentage of malware in the testing set by ran-
domly downsampling goodware, so the number of malware
remains fixed throughout the experiments.2 For completeness,
we report the two training settings from Table 1 with 10%
and 90% malware, respectively.
Let us first focus on the malware performance (dashed
lines). All plots in Figure 2 exhibit constant Recall, and in-
creasing Precision for increasing percentage of malware in
the testing. Precision for the malware (mw) class—the pos-
itive class—is defined as Pmw = T P/(T P+FP) and Recall as
Rmw = T P/(T P+FN). In this scenario, we can observe that TPs
(i.e., malware objects correctly classified as malware) and FNs
(i.e., malware objects incorrectly classified as goodware) do
not change, because the number of malware does not increase;
hence, Recall remains stable. The increase in number of FPs
(i.e., goodware objects misclassified as malware) decreases
as we reduce the number of goodware in the dataset; hence,
Precision improves. Since the F1-Score is the harmonic mean
of Precision and Recall, it goes up with Precision. We also
observe that, inversely, the Precision for the goodware (gw)
class—the negative class—Pgw = T N/(T N+FN) decreases (see
yellow solid lines in Figure 2), because we are reducing the
TNs while the FNs do not change. This example shows how
considering an unrealistic testing distribution with more mal-
ware than goodware in this context (§2.2) positively inflates
Precision and hence the F1-Score of the malware classifier.
2We choose to downsample goodware to achieve up to 90% of malware
Spatial experimental bias in training. To understand the
impact of altering malware-to-goodware ratios in training, we
now consider a motivating example with a linear SVM in a
2D feature space, with features x1 and x2. Figure 3 reports
three scenarios, all with the same 10% malware in testing, but
with 10%, 50%, and 90% malware in training.
We can observe that with an increasing percentage of mal-
ware in training, the hyperplane moves towards goodware.
More formally, it improves Recall of malware while reducing
its Precision. The opposite is true for goodware. To mini-
mize the overall error rate Err = (FP+FN)/(T P+T N+FP+FN)
(i.e., maximize Accuracy), one should train the dataset with
the same distribution that is expected in the testing. However,
in this scenario one may have more interest in finding objects
of the minority class (e.g., “more malware”) by improving
Recall subject to a constraint on maximum FPR.
Figure 4 shows the performance for ALG1 and ALG2, for
increasing percentages of malware in training on the X-axis;
just for completeness (since one cannot artificially change the
test distribution to achieve realistic evaluations), we report
results both for 10% mw in testing and for 90% malware in
testing, but we remark that in the Android setting we have
estimated 10% mw in the wild (§2.2). These plots confirm
the trend in our motivating example (Figure 3), that is, Rmw
increases but Pmw decreases. For the plots with 10% mw in
(mw) for testing because of the computational and storage resources required
to achieve such a ratio by oversampling. This does not alter the conclusions
of our analysis. Let us assume a scenario in which we keep the same number
of goodware (gw), and increase the percentage of mw in the dataset by over-
sampling mw. The precision (Pmw = T P/(T P+FP)) would increase because TPs
would increase for any mw detection, and FPs would not change—because
the number of gw remains the same; if training (resp. testing) observations
are sampled from a distribution similar to the mw in the original dataset (e.g.,
new training mw is from 2014 and new testing mw comes from 2015 and
2016), then Recall (Rmw = T P/(T P+FN)) would be stable—it would have the
same proportions of TPs and FNs because the classifier will have a similar
predictive capability for finding mw. Hence, if the number of mw in the
dataset increases, the F1-Score would increase as well, because Precision
increases while Recall remains stable.
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Figure 2: Spatial experimental bias in testing. Training on 2014 and testing on 2015 and 2016. For increasing % of malware in
the testing (unrealistic setting), Precision for malware increases and Recall remains the same; overall, F1-Score increases for
increasing percentage of malware in the testing. However, having more malware than goodware in testing does not reflect the
in-the-wild distribution of 10% malware (§2.2), so the setting with more malware is unrealistic and reports biased results.
testing, we observe there is a point in which F1-Scoremw is
maximum while the error for the gw class is within 5%.
In §4.3, we propose a novel algorithm to improve the per-
formance of the malware class according to the objective
of the user (high Precision, Recall or F1-Score), subject to a
maximum tolerated error. Moreover, in §4 we introduce con-
straints and metrics to guarantee bias-free evaluations, while
revealing counter-intuitive results.
4 Space-Time Aware Evaluation
We now formalize how to perform an evaluation of an Android
malware classifier free from spatio-temporal bias. We define
a novel set of constraints that must be followed for realistic
evaluations (§4.1); we introduce a novel time-aware metric,
AUT, that captures in one number the impact of time decay
on a classifier (§4.2); we propose a novel tuning algorithm
that empirically optimizes a classifier performance, subject
to a maximum tolerated error (§4.3); finally, we introduce
TESSERACT and provide counter-intuitive results through
unbiased evaluations (§4.4). To improve readability, we report
in Appendix A.2 a table with all the major symbols used in
the remainder of this paper.
4.1 Evaluation Constraints
Let us consider D as a labeled dataset with two classes: mal-
ware (positive class) and goodware (negative class). Let us
define si ∈ D as an object (e.g., Android app) with timestamp
time(si). To evaluate the classifier, the dataset D must be split
into a training dataset Tr with a time window of size W , and
a testing dataset Ts with a time window of size S. Here, we
consider S >W in order to estimate long-term performance
and robustness to decay of the classifier. A user may consider
different time splits depending on his objectives, provided
each split has a significant number of samples. We emphasize
that, although we have the labels of objects in Ts⊆ D, all the
evaluations and tuning algorithms must assume that labels yi
of objects si ∈ Ts are unknown.
To evaluate performance over time, the test set Ts must be
split into time-slots of size ∆. For example, for a testing set
time window of size S = 2 years, we may have ∆= 1 month.
This parameter is chosen by the user, but it is important that
the chosen granularity allows for a statistically significant
number of objects in each test window [ti, ti+∆).
We now formalize three constraints that must be enforced
when dividing D into Tr and Ts for a realistic setting that
avoids spatio-temporal experimental bias (§3). While C1 was
proposed in past work [2, 36], we are the first to propose C2
and C3—which we show to be fundamental in §4.4.
C1) Temporal training consistency. All the objects in
the training must be strictly temporally precedent to the test-
ing ones:
time(si)< time(s j),∀si ∈ Tr,∀s j ∈ Ts (1)
where si (resp. s j) is an object in the training set Tr (resp.
testing set Ts). Eq. 1 must hold; its violation inflates the
results by including future knowledge in the classifier (§3.2).
C2) Temporal gw/mw windows consistency. In every
testing slot of size ∆, all test objects must be from the same
time window:
tmini ≤ time(sk)≤ tmaxi , ∀sk in time slot [ti, ti+∆) (2)
where tmini = mink time(sk) and t
max
i = maxk time(sk). The
same should hold for the training: although violating Eq. 2
in the training data does not bias the evaluation, it may affect
the sensitivity of the classifier to unrelated artifacts. Eq. 2 has
been violated in the past when goodware and malware have
been collected from different time windows (e.g., ALG2 [33],
re-evaluated in §4.4)—if violated, the results are biased be-
cause the classifier may learn and test on artifactual behaviors
that, for example, distinguish goodware from malware just by
their different API versions.
C3) Realistic malware-to-goodware ratio in testing. Let
us define ϕ as the average percentage of malware in training
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Figure 3: Motivating example for the intuition of spatial experimental bias in training with Linear-SVM and two features, x1 and
x2. The training changes, but the testing points are fixed: 90% gw and 10% mw. When the % of malware in the training increases,
the decision boundary moves towards the goodware class, improving Recall for malware but decreasing Precision.
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Figure 4: Spatial experimental bias in training. Training on 2014 and testing on 2015 and 2016. For increasing % of malware in
the training, Precision decreases and Recall increases, for the motivations illustrated in the example of Figure 3. In §4.3, we
devise an algorithm to find the best training configuration for optimizing Precision, Recall, or F1 (depending on user needs).
data, and δ as the average percentage of malware in the testing
data. Let σˆ be the estimated percentage of malware in the
wild. To have a realistic evaluation, the average percentage of
malware in the testing (δ) must be as close as possible to the
percentage of malware in the wild (σˆ), so that:
δ' σˆ (3)
For example, we have estimated that in the Android scenario
goodware is predominant over malware, with σˆ≈ 0.10 (§2.2).
If C3 is violated by overestimating the percentage of malware,
the results are positively inflated (§3.3). We highlight that,
although the testing distribution δ cannot be changed (in or-
der to get realistic results), the percentage of malware in the
training ϕ may be tuned (§4.3).
4.2 Time-aware Performance Metrics
We introduce a time-aware performance metric that allows
for the comparison of different classifiers while considering
time decay. Let Θ be a classifier trained on Tr; we capture
the performance of Θ for each time frame [ti, ti +∆) of the
testing set Ts (e.g., each month). We identify two options to
represent per-month performance:
• Point estimates (pnt): The value plotted on the Y -axis
for xk = k∆ (where k is the test slot number) computes
the performance metric (e.g., F1-Score) only based on
predictions yˆi of Θ and true labels yi in the interval [W +
(k−1)∆,W + k∆).
• Cumulative estimates (cml): The value plotted on the
Y -axis for xk = k∆ (where k is the test slot number) com-
putes the performance metric (e.g., F1-Score) only based
on predictions yˆi ofΘ and true labels yi in the cumulative
interval [W,W + k∆).
Point estimates are always to be preferred to represent the
real performance of an algorithm. The cumulative estimates
can be used to highlight a smoothed trend and to show overall
performance up to a certain point, but can be misleading if
reported on their own if objects are too sparsely distributed
in some test slots ∆. Hence, we report only point estimates in
the remainder of the paper (e.g., in §4.4), while an example
of cumulative estimate plots is reported in Appendix A.3.
To facilitate the comparison of different time decay plots,
we define a new metric, Area Under Time (AUT), the area
under the performance curve over time. Formally, based on the
trapezoidal rule (as in AUROC [8]), AUT is defined as follows:
AUT ( f ,N) =
1
N−1
N−1
∑
k=1
[ f (xk+1)+ f (xk)] · (1/N)
2
(4)
where: f (xk) is the value of the point estimate of the perfor-
mance metric f (e.g., F1) evaluated at point xk := (W + k∆);
N is the number of test slots, and 1/(N−1) is a normalization
factor so that AUT ∈ [0,1]. The perfect classifier with robust-
ness to time decay in the time window S has AUT = 1. By
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default, AUT is computed as the area under point estimates, as
they capture the trend of the classifier over time more closely;
if the AUT is computed on cumulative estimates, it should be
explicitly marked as AUTcml. As an example, AUT(F1,12m)
is the point estimate of F1-Score considering time decay for a
period of 12 months, with a 1-month interval. We highlight
that the simplicity of computing the AUT should be seen as a
benefit rather than a drawback; it is a simple yet effective met-
ric that captures the performance of a classifier with respect
to time decay, de-facto promoting a fair comparison across
different approaches.
AUT( f ,N) is a metric that allows us to evaluate perfor-
mance f of a malware classifier against time decay over N
time units in realistic experimental settings—obtained by
enforcing C1, C2, and C3 (§4.1). The next sections lever-
age AUT for tuning classifiers and comparing different
solutions (§4.4).
4.3 Tuning Training Ratio
We propose a novel algorithm that allows for the adjustment
of the training ratio ϕ when the dataset is imbalanced, in order
to optimize a user-specified performance metric (F1, Preci-
sion, or Recall) on the minority class, subject to a maximum
tolerated error, while aiming to reduce time decay. The high-
level intuition of the impact of changing ϕ is described in §3.3.
We also observe that ML literature has shown ROC curves to
be misleading on highly imbalanced datasets [14, 25]. Choos-
ing different thresholds on ROC curves shifts the decision
boundary, but (as seen in the motivating example of Figure 3)
re-training with different ratios ϕ (as in our algorithm) also
changes the shape of the decision boundary, better represent-
ing the minority class.
Our tuning algorithm is inspired by one proposed by Weiss
and Provost [55]; they propose a progressive sampling of
training objects to collect a dataset that improves AUROC
performance of the minority class in an imbalanced dataset.
However, they did not take temporal constraints into account
(§3.2), and heuristically optimize only AUROC. Conversely,
we enforce C1, C2, C3 (§4.1), and rely on AUT to achieve
three possible targets for the malware class: higher F1-Score,
higher Precision, or higher Recall. Also, we assume that the
user already has a training dataset Tr and wants to use as many
objects from it as possible, while still achieving a good perfor-
mance trade-off; for this purpose, we perform a progressive
subsampling of the goodware class.
Algorithm 1 formally presents our methodology for tuning
the parameter ϕ to find the value ϕ∗P that optimizes P subject
to a maximum error rate Emax. The algorithm aims to solve
the following optimization problem:
maximizeϕ{P} subject to: E ≤ Emax (5)
where P is the target performance: the F1-Score (F1), Preci-
sion (Pr) or Recall (Rec) of the malware class; Emax is the
maximum tolerated error; depending on the target P, the error
rate E has a different formulation:
• if P= F1→ E= 1−Acc = (FP+FN)/(T P+T N+FP+FN)
• if P= Rec→ E= FPR = FP/(T N+FP)
• if P= Pr→ E= FNR = FN/(T P+FN)
Each of these definitions of E is targeted to limit the error
induced by the specific performance—if we want to maximize
F1 for the malware class, we need to limit both FPs and FNs;
if P= Pr, we increase FNs, so we constrain FNR.
Algorithm 1 consists of two phases: initialization (lines 1–
5) and grid search of ϕ∗P (lines 6–14). In the initialization
phase, the training set Tr is split into a proper training set
ProperTr and a validation set Val; this is split according to
the space-time evaluation constraints in §4.1, so that all the
objects in ProperTr are temporally anterior to Val, and the
malware percentage δ in Val is equal to σˆ, the in-the-wild
malware percentage. The maximum performance observed P∗
and the optimal training ratio ϕ∗P are initialized by assuming
the estimated in-the-wild malware ratio σˆ for training; in
Android, σˆ≈ 10% (see §2.2).
The grid-search phase iterates over different values of ϕ,
with a learning rate µ (e.g., µ = 0.05), and keeps as ϕ∗P the
value leading to the best performance, subject to the error
constraint. To reduce the chance of discarding high-quality
points while downsampling goodware, we prioritize the most
uncertain points (e.g., points close to the decision boundary
in an SVM) [46]. The constraint on line 6 (σˆ≤ ϕ≤ 0.5) is to
ensure that one does not under-represent the minority class (if
ϕ< σˆ) and that one does not let it become the majority class
(if ϕ> 0.5); also, from §3.3 it is clear that if ϕ> 0.5, then the
error rate becomes too high for the goodware class. Finally,
the grid-search explores multiple values of ϕ and stores the
best ones. To capture time-aware performance, we rely on
AUT (§4.2), and the error rate is computed according to the
target P (see above). Tuning examples are in §4.4.
4.4 TESSERACT: Revealing Hidden Performance
Here, we show how our methodology can reveal hidden per-
formance of ALG1 [4], ALG2 [33], and DL [22] (§2.1), and
their robustness to time decay.
We develop TESSERACT as an open-source Python frame-
work that enforces constraints C1, C2, and C3 (§4.1), com-
putes AUT (§4.2), and can train a classifier with our tuning
algorithm (§4.3). TESSERACT operates as a traditional Python
ML library but, in addition to features matrix X and labels y,
it also takes as input the timestamp array t containing dates
for each object. Details about TESSERACT’s implementation
and generality are in §A.5.
Figure 5 reports several performance metrics of the three al-
gorithms as point estimates over time. The X-axis reports the
testing slots in months, whereas the Y -axis reports different
scores between 0 and 1. The areas highlighted in blue corre-
spond to the AUT(F1,24m). The black dash-dotted horizontal
lines represent the best F1 from the original papers [4, 22, 33],
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Figure 5: Time decay of ALG1 [4], ALG2 [33] and DL [22]—with AUT(F1,24m) of 0.58, 0.32 and 0.64, respectively. Training
and test distribution both have 10% malware. The drop in the last 3 months is also related to lower samples in the dataset.
Algorithm 1: Tuning ϕ.
Input: Training dataset Tr
Parameters :Learning rate µ, target performance P ∈ {F1,Pr,Rec},
max error rate Emax
Output: ϕ∗P, optimal percentage of mw to use in training to achieve
the best target performance P subject to E<Emax.
1 Split the training set Tr into two subsets: actual training (ProperTr)
and validation set (Val), while enforcing C1, C2, C3 (§4.1), also
implying δ= σˆ
2 Divide Val into N non-overlapped subsets, each corresponding to a
time-slot ∆, so that Valarray = [V0,V1, ...,VN ]
3 Train a classifier Θ on ProperTr
4 P∗ ← AUT(P,N) on Valarray with Θ
5 ϕ∗P = σˆ
6 for (ϕ= σˆ; ϕ≤ 0.5; ϕ= ϕ+µ) do
7 Downsample gw in ProperTr so that percentage of mw is ϕ
8 Train the classifier Θϕ on ProperTr with ϕ mw
9 performance Pϕ ← AUT(P, N) on Valarray with Θϕ
10 error Eϕ ← Error rate on Valarray with Θϕ
11 if (Pϕ > P∗) and (Eϕ ≤Emax) then
12 P∗ ← Pϕ
13 ϕ∗P← ϕ
14 return ϕ∗P;
corresponding to results obtained with 10 hold-out random
splits for ALG1, 10-fold CV for ALG2, and random split for
DL; all these settings are analogous to k-fold from a tem-
poral bias perspective, and violate both C1 and C2. The red
dashed horizontal lines correspond to 10-fold F1 obtained on
our dataset, which satisfies C3.
Differences in 10-fold F1. We discuss and motivate the
differences between the horizontal lines representing origi-
nal papers’ best F1 and replicated 10-fold F1. The 10-fold F1
of ALG1 is close to the original paper [4]; the difference is
likely related to the use of a different, more recent dataset.
The 10-fold F1 of ALG2 is much lower than the one in the
paper. We verified that this is mostly caused by violating C3:
the best F1 reported in [33] is on a setting with 86% malware—
hence, spatial bias increases even 10-fold F1 of ALG2. Also
violating C2 tends to inflate the 10-fold performance as the
classifier may learn artifacts. The 10-fold F1 in DL is instead
slightly higher than in the original paper [22]; this is likely
related to a hyperparameter tuning in the original paper that
optimized Accuracy (instead of F1), which is known to be
misleading in imbalanced datasets. Details on hyperparame-
ters chosen are in §A.1. From these results, we can observe
that even if an analyst wants to estimate what the performance
of the classifier would be in the absence of concept drift (i.e.,
where objects coming from the same distribution of the train-
ing dataset are received by the classifier), she still needs to
enforce C2 and C3 while computing 10-fold CV to obtain
valid results.
Violating C1 and C2. Removing the temporal bias reveals
the real performance of each algorithm in the presence of con-
cept drift. The AUT(F1,24m) quantifies such performance:
0.58 for ALG1, 0.32 for ALG2 and 0.64 for DL. In all three
scenarios, the AUT(F1,24m) is lower than 10-fold F1 as the
latter violates constraint C1 and may violate C2 if the dataset
classes are not evenly distributed across the timeline (§4).
Best performing algorithm. TESSERACT shows a
counter-intuitive result: the algorithm that is most robust to
time decay and has the highest performance over the 2 years
testing is the DL algorithm (after removing space-time bias),
although for the first few months ALG1 outperforms DL.
Given this outcome, one may prefer to use ALG1 for the first
few months and then DL, if retraining is not possible (§5).
We observe that this strongly contradicts the performance
obtained in the presence of temporal and spatial bias. In par-
ticular, if we only looked at the best F1 reported in the original
papers, ALG2 would have been the best algorithm (because
spatial bias was present). After enforcing C3, the k-fold on
our dataset would have suggested that DL and ALG1 have
similar performance (because of temporal bias). After enforc-
ing C1, C2 and C3, the AUT reveals that DL is actually the
algorithm most robust to time decay.
Different robustness to time decay. Given a training
dataset, the robustness of different ML models against perfor-
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mance decay over time depends on several factors. Although
more in-depth evaluations would be required to understand
the theoretical motivations behind the different robustness to
time decay of the three algorithms in our setting, we hereby
provide insights on possible reasons. The performance of
ALG2 is the fastest to decay likely because its feature engi-
neering [33] may be capturing relations in the training data
that quickly become obsolete at test time to separate good-
ware from malware. Although ALG1 and DL take as input
the same feature space, the higher robustness to time decay
of DL is likely related to feature representation in the latent
feature space automatically identified by deep learning [19],
which appears to be more robust to time decay in this specific
setting. Recent results have also shown that linear SVM tends
to overemphasize a few important features [35]—which are
the few most effective on the training data, but may become
obsolete over time. We remark that we are not claiming that
deep learning is always more robust to time decay than tradi-
tional ML algorithms. Instead, we demonstrate how, in this
specific setting, TESSERACT allowed us to highlight higher
robustness of DL [22] against time decay; however, the prices
to pay to use DL are lower explainability [23, 42] and higher
training time [19].
Tuning algorithm. We now evaluate whether our tuning
(Algorithm 1 in §4.3) improves robustness to time decay
of a malware classifier for a given target performance. We
first aim to maximize P = F1-Score of malware class, sub-
ject to Emax= 10%. After running Algorithm 1 on ALG1 [4],
ALG2 [33] and DL, we find that ϕ∗F1 = 0.25 for ALG1 and DL,
and ϕ∗F1 = 0.5 for ALG2. Figure 6 reports the improvement
on the test performance of applying ϕ∗F1 to the full training set
Tr of 1 year. We remark that the choice of ϕ∗F1 uses only train-
ing information (see Algorithm 1) and no test information is
used—the optimal value is chosen from a 4-month validation
set extracted from the 1 year of training data; this is to simu-
late a realistic deployment setting in which we have no a priori
information about testing. Figure 6 shows that our approach
for finding the best ϕ∗F1 improves the F1-Score on malware
at test time, at the cost of slightly reduced goodware perfor-
mance. Table 2 shows details of how total FPs, total FNs, and
AUT changed by training ALG1, ALG2, and DL with ϕ∗F1 ,
ϕ∗Prec, and ϕ∗Rec instead of σˆ. These training ratios have been
computed subject to Emax = 5% for ϕ∗Rec, Emax = 10% for ϕ∗F1 ,
and Emax = 15% for ϕ∗Prec; the difference in the maximum
tolerated errors is motivated by the class imbalance in the
dataset—which causes lower FPR and higher FNR values
(see definitions in §4.3), as there are many more goodware
than malware. As expected (§3.3), Table 2 shows that when
training with ϕ∗F1 Precision decreases (FPs increase) but Re-
call increases (because FNs decrease), and the overall AUT
increases slightly as a trade-off. A similar reasoning follows
for the other performance targets. We observe that the AUT
for Precision may slightly differ even with a similar number
of total FPs—this is because AUT(Pr,24m) is sensitive to the
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Figure 6: Tuning improvement obtained by applying ϕ∗F1 =
25% to ALG1 and DL, and ϕ∗F1 = 50% to ALG2. The values
of ϕ∗F1 are obtained with Algorithm 1 and one year of training
data (trained on 8 months and validated on 4 months).
Algorithm ϕ FP FN AUT(P,24m)
F1 Pr Rec
ALG1 [4]
10% (σˆ) 965 3,851 0.58 0.75 0.48
25% (ϕ∗F1 ) 2,156 2,815 0.62 0.65 0.61
10% (ϕ∗Pr) 965 3,851 0.58 0.75 0.48
50% (ϕ∗Rec) 3,728 1,793 0.64 0.58 0.74
ALG2 [33]
10% (σˆ) 274 5,689 0.32 0.77 0.20
50% (ϕ∗F1 ) 4,160 2,689 0.53 0.50 0.60
10% (ϕ∗Pr) 274 5,689 0.32 0.77 0.20
50% (ϕ∗Rec) 4,160 2,689 0.53 0.50 0.60
DL [22]
10% (σˆ) 968 3,291 0.64 0.78 0.53
25% (ϕ∗F1 ) 2,284 2,346 0.65 0.66 0.65
10% (ϕ∗Pr) 968 3,291 0.64 0.78 0.53
25% (ϕ∗Rec) 2,284 2,346 0.65 0.66 0.65
Table 2: Testing AUTs performance over 24 months when
training with σˆ, ϕ∗F1 , ϕ
∗
Pr and ϕ∗Rec.
time at which FPs occur; the same observation is valid for to-
tal FNs and AUT Recall. After tuning, the F1 performance of
ALG1 and DL become similar, although DL remains higher
in terms of AUT. The tuning improves the AUT(F1,24m) of
DL only marginally, as DL is already robust to time decay
even before tuning (Figure 5).
The next section focuses on the two classifiers less robust
to time decay, ALG1 and ALG2, to evaluate with TESSER-
ACT the performance-cost trade-offs of budget-constrained
strategies for delaying time decay.
5 Delaying Time Decay
We have shown how enforcing constraints and computing
AUT with TESSERACT can reveal the real performance of
Android malware classifiers (§4.4). This baseline AUT per-
formance (without retraining) allows users to evaluate the
general robustness of an algorithm to time decay. A classifier
may be retrained to update its model. However, manual la-
beling is costly (especially in the Android malware setting),
and the ML community [6, 46] has worked extensively on
mitigation strategies—e.g., to identify a limited number of
best objects to label (active learning). While effective at post-
poning time decay, strategies like these can further complicate
the fair evaluation and comparison of classifiers.
In this section, we show how TESSERACT can be used
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Figure 7: Delaying time decay: incremental retraining.
to compare and evaluate the trade-offs of different budget-
constrained strategies to delay time decay. Since DL has
shown to be more robust to time decay (§4.4) than ALG1 and
ALG2, in this section we focus our attention these to show
performance-cost trade-offs of different mitigations.
5.1 Delay Strategies
We do not propose novel delay strategies, but instead focus on
how TESSERACT allows for the comparison of some popular
approaches to mitigating time decay. This shows researchers
how to adopt TESSERACT for the fair comparison of different
approaches when proposing novel solutions to delaying time
decay under budget constraints. We now summarize the delay
strategies we consider and show results on our dataset. For
interested readers, we include additional background knowl-
edge on these strategies in §A.4.
Incremental retraining. We first consider an approach
that represents an ideal upper bound on performance, where
all points are included in retraining every month. This is
likely unrealistic as it requires continuously labeling all the
objects. Even assuming a reliance on VirusTotal, there is still
an API usage cost associated with higher query rates and the
approach may be ill-suited in other security domains. Figure 7
shows the performance of ALG1 and ALG2 with monthly
incremental retraining.
Active learning. Active Learning (AL) strategies inves-
tigate how to select a subset of test objects (with unknown
labels) that, if manually labeled and included in the training
set, should be the most valuable for updating the classification
model [46]. Here, we consider the most popular AL query
strategy, uncertainty sampling, in which the points with the
most uncertain predictions are selected for retraining, under
the intuition that they are the most relevant to adjust decision
boundaries. Figure 8 reports the active learning results ob-
tained with uncertainty sampling, for different percentages of
objects labeled per month. We observe that even with 1% AL,
the performance already improves significantly.
Costs Performance
L Q
P : AUT(F1,24m)
Delay ϕ= σˆ ϕ= ϕ∗F1
method ALG1 ALG2 ALG1 ALG2 ALG1 ALG2 ALG1 ALG2
No update 0 0 0 0 0.577 0.317 0.622 0.527
Rejection (σˆ) 0 0 10,283 3,595 0.717 0.280 – –
Rejection (ϕ∗F1 ) 0 0 10,576 24,390 – – 0.704 0.683
AL: 1% 709 709 0 0 0.708 0.456 0.703 0.589
AL: 2.5% 1,788 1,788 0 0 0.738 0.509 0.758 0.667
AL: 5% 3,589 3,589 0 0 0.782 0.615 0.784 0.680
AL: 7.5% 5,387 5,387 0 0 0.793 0.641 0.801 0.714
AL: 10% 7,189 7,189 0 0 0.796 0.656 0.802 0.732
AL: 25% 17,989 17,989 0 0 0.821 0.674 0.823 0.732
AL: 50% 35,988 35,988 0 0 0.817 0.679 0.828 0.741
Inc. retrain 71,988 71,988 0 0 0.818 0.679 0.830 0.736
Table 3: Performance-cost comparison of delay methods.
Classification with rejection. Another mitigation strategy
involves rejecting a classifier’s decision as “low confidence”
and delaying the decision to a future date [6]. This isolates
the rejected objects to a quarantine area which will later re-
quire manual inspection. Figure 9 reports the performance of
ALG1 and ALG2 after applying a reject option based on [26].
In particular, we use the third quartile of probabilities of in-
correct predictions as the rejection threshold [26]. The gray
histograms in the background report the number of rejected
objects per month. The second year of testing has more re-
jected objects for both ALG1 and ALG2, although ALG2
overall rejects more objects.
5.2 Analysis of Delay Methods
To quantify performance-cost trade-offs of methods to de-
lay time decay without changing the algorithm, we charac-
terize the following three elements: Performance (P), the
performance measured in terms of AUT to capture robustness
against time decay (§4.2); Labeling Cost (L), the number
of testing objects (if any) that must be labeled—the labeling
must occur periodically (e.g., every month), and is particularly
costly in the malware domain as manual inspection requires
many resources (infrastructure, time, expertise, etc)—for ex-
ample, Miller et al. [36] estimated that an average company
could manually label 80 objects per day; Quarantine Cost
(Q), the number of objects (if any) rejected by the classifier—
these must be manually verified, so there is a cost for leaving
them in quarantine.
Table 3, utilizing AUT(F1,24m) while enforcing our con-
straints, reports a summary of labeling cost L, quarantine cost
Q, and two performance columns P, corresponding to training
with σˆ and ϕ∗F1 (§4.3), respectively. In each row, we highlight
in purple cells (resp. orange) the column with the highest AUT
for ALG2 (resp. ALG1). Table 3 allows us to: (i) examine
the effectiveness of the training ratios ϕ∗F1 and σˆ; (ii) analyze
the AUT performance improvement and the corresponding
costs for delaying time decay; (iii) compare the performance
of ALG1 and ALG2 in different settings.
First, let us compare ϕ∗F1 with σˆ. The first row of Table 3
represents the scenario in which the model is trained only
once at the beginning—the scenario for which we originally
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Figure 8: Delay time decay: performance with active learning based on uncertainty sampling.
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Figure 9: Delay time decay: classification with rejection.
designed Algorithm 1 (§4.3 and Figure 6). Without methods
to delay time decay, ϕ∗F1 achieves better performance than
σˆ for both ALG1 and ALG2 at no cost. In all other config-
urations, we observe that training ϕ= ϕ∗F1 always improves
performance for ALG2, whereas for ALG1 it is slightly ad-
vantageous in most cases except for rejection and AL 1%—in
general, the performance of ALG1 trained with ϕ∗F1 and σˆ is
consistently close. The intuition for this outcome is that ϕ∗F1
and σˆ are also close for ALG1: when applying the AL strat-
egy, we re-apply Algorithm 1 at each step and find that the
average ϕ∗F1 ≈ 15% for ALG1, which is close to 10% (i.e., σˆ).
On the other hand, for ALG2 the average ϕ∗F1 ≈ 50%, which
is far from σˆ and improves all results significantly. We can
conclude that our tuning algorithm is most effective when it
finds a ϕ∗P that differs from the estimated σˆ.
Then, we analyze the performance improvement and related
cost of using delay methods. The improvement in F1-Score
granted by our algorithm comes at no labeling or quarantine
cost. We can observe that one can improve the in-the-wild
performance of the algorithms at some cost L or Q. It is
important to observe that objects discarded or to be labeled
are not necessarily malware; they are just the objects most
uncertain according to the algorithm, which the classifier may
have likely misclassified. The labeling costs L for ALG1 and
ALG2 are identical (same dataset); in AL, the percentage of
retrained objects is user-specified and fixed.
Finally, Table 3 shows that ALG1 consistently outperforms
ALG2 on F1 for all performance-cost trade-offs. This confirms
the trend seen in the realistic settings of Table 1.
This section shows that TESSERACT is helpful to both
researchers and industrial practitioners. Practitioners need to
estimate the performance of a classifier in the wild, compare
different algorithms, and determine resources required for
L and Q. For researchers, it is useful to understand how to
reduce costs L and Q while improving classifiers performance
P through comparable, unbiased evaluations. The problem is
challenging, but we hope that releasing TESSERACT’s code
fosters further research and widespread adoption.
6 Discussion
We now discuss guidelines, our assumptions, and how we
address limitations of our work.
Actionable points on TESSERACT. It is relevant to dis-
cuss how both researchers and practitioners can benefit from
TESSERACT and our findings. A baseline AUT performance
(without classifier retraining) allows users to evaluate the
general robustness of an algorithm to performance decay
(§4.2). We demonstrate how TESSERACT can reveal true
performance and provide counter-intuitive results (§4.4). Ro-
bustness over extended time periods is practically relevant for
deployment scenarios without the financial or computational
resources to label and retrain often. Even with retraining
strategies (§5), classifiers may not perform consistently over
time. Manual labeling is costly, and the ML community has
worked on mitigation strategies to identify a limited number of
best objects to label (e.g., active learning [46]). TESSERACT
takes care of removing spatio-temporal bias from evaluations,
so that researchers can focus on the proposal of more robust
algorithms (§5). In this context, TESSERACT allows for the
creation of comparable baselines for algorithms in a time-
aware setting. Moreover, TESSERACT can be used with dif-
ferent time granularity, provided each period has a significant
number of samples. For example, if researchers are interested
in increasing robustness to decay for the upcoming 3 months,
they can use TESSERACT to produce bias-free comparisons
of their approach with prior research, while considering time
decay.
Generalization to other security domains. Although we
used TESSERACT in the Android domain, our methodology
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generalizes and can be immediately applied to any machine
learning-driven security domain to achieve an evaluation with-
out spatio-temporal bias. Our methodology, although general,
requires some domain-specific parameters that reflect realis-
tic conditions (e.g., time granularity ∆ and test time length).
This is not a weakness of our work, but rather an expected
requirement. In general, it is reasonable to expect that spatio-
temporal bias may afflict other security domains when af-
fected by concept drift and i.i.d. does not hold—however,
further experiments in other domains (e.g., Windows mal-
ware, code vulnerabilities) are required to make any scientific
conclusion. TESSERACT can be used to understand the extent
to which spatio-temporal bias affects such security domains;
however, the ability to generalize requires access to large
timestamped datasets, knowledge of realistic class ratios, and
code or sufficient details to reproduce baselines.
Domain-specific in-the-wild malware percentage σˆ. In
the Android landscape, we assume that σˆ is around 10%
(§2.2). Correctly estimating the malware percentage in the
testing dataset is a challenging task and we encourage further
representative measurement studies [30, 53] and data sharing
to obtain realistic experimental settings.
Correct observation labels. We assume goodware and
malware labels in the dataset are correct (§2.3). Miller et
al. [36] found that AVs sometimes change their outcome over
time: some goodware may eventually be tagged as malware.
However, they also found that VirusTotal detections stabilize
after one year; since we are using observations up to Dec
2016, we consider VirusTotal’s labels as reliable. In the future,
we may integrate approaches for noisy oracles [15], which
assume some observations are mislabeled.
Timestamps in the dataset. It is important to consider
that some timestamps in a public dataset could be incorrect or
invalid. In this paper, we rely on the public AndroZoo dataset
maintained at the University of Luxembourg, and we rely on
the dex_date attribute as the approximation of an observa-
tion timestamp, as recommended by the dataset creators [3].
We further verified the reliability of the dex_date attribute
by re-downloading VirusTotal [20] reports for 25K apps3 and
verifying that the first_seen attribute always matched the
dex_date within our time span. In general, we recommend
performing some sanitization of a timestamped dataset be-
fore performing any analysis on it: if multiple timestamps
are available for each object, consider the most reliable times-
tamp you have access to (e.g., the timestamp recommended
by the dataset creators, or the VirusTotal’s first_seen at-
tribute) and discard objects with “impossible” timestamps
(e.g., with dates which are either too old or in the future),
which may be caused by incorrect parsing or invalid values
of some timestamps. To improve trustworthiness of the times-
tamps, one could verify whether a given object contains time
inconsistencies or features not yet available when the app
3We downloaded only 25K VT reports (corresponding to about 20% of
our dataset) due to restrictions on our VirusTotal API usage quota.
was released [29]. We encourage the community to promptly
notify dataset maintainers of any date inconsistencies. In the
TESSERACT’s project website (§8), we will maintain an up-
dated list of timestamped datasets publicly available for the
security community.
Choosing time granularity (∆). Choosing the length of
the time slots (i.e., time granularity) largely depends on the
sparseness of the available dataset: in general, the granularity
should be chosen to be as small as possible, while containing
a statistically significant number of samples—as a rule of
thumb, we keep the buckets large enough to have at least
1000 objects, which in our case leads to a monthly granularity.
If there are restrictions on the number of time slots that can
be considered (perhaps due to limited processing power), a
coarser granularity can be used; however if the granularity
becomes too large then the true trend might not be captured.
Resilience of malware classifiers. In our study, we ana-
lyze three recent high-profile classifiers. One could argue
that other classifiers may show consistently high performance
even with space-time bias eliminated. And this should indeed
be the goal of research on malware classification. TESSER-
ACT provides a mechanism for an unbiased evaluation that
we hope will support this kind of work.
Adversarial ML. Adversarial ML focuses on perturbing
training or testing observations to compel a classifier to make
incorrect predictions [7]. Both relate to concepts of robust-
ness and one can characterize adversarial ML as an artifi-
cially induced worst-case concept drift scenario. While the
adversarial setting remains an open problem, the experimental
bias we describe in this work—endemic in Android malware
classification—must be addressed prior to realistic evaluations
of adversarial mitigations.
7 Related Work
A common experimental bias in security is the base rate fal-
lacy [5], which states that in highly-imbalanced datasets (e.g.,
network intrusion detection, where most traffic is benign),
TPR and FPR are misleading performance metrics, because
even FPR = 1% may correspond to millions of FPs and only
thousands of TPs. In contrast, our work identifies experi-
mental settings that are misleading regardless of the adopted
metrics, and that remain incorrect even if the right metrics
are used (§4.4). Sommer and Paxson [47] discuss challenges
and guidelines in ML-based intrusion detection; Rossow et
al. [44] discuss best practices for conducting malware ex-
periments; van der Kouwe et al. [54] identify 22 common
errors in system security evaluations. While helpful, these
works [44,47,54] do not identify temporal and spatial bias, do
not focus on Android, and do not quantify the impact of errors
on classifiers performance, and their guidelines would not
prevent all sources of temporal and spatial bias we identify.
To be precise, Rossow et al. [44] evaluate the percentage of
objects—in previously adopted datasets—that are “incorrect”
(e.g., goodware labeled as malware, malfunctioning malware),
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but without evaluating impact on classifier performance. Zhou
et al. [58] have recently shown that Hardware Performance
Counters (HPCs) are not really effective for malware classi-
fication; while interesting and in line with the spirit of our
work, their focus is very narrow, and they rely on 10-fold CV
in the evaluation.
Allix et al. [2] broke new ground by evaluating malware
classifiers in relation to time and showing how future knowl-
edge can inflate performance, but do not propose any solution
for comparable evaluations and only identify C1. As a sepa-
rate issue, Allix et al. [1] investigated the difference between
in-the-lab and in-the-wild scenarios and found that the greater
presence of goodware leads to lower performance. We sys-
tematically analyze and explain these issues and help address
them by formalizing a set of constraints (jointly considering
the impact of temporal and spatial bias), introducing AUT
as a unified performance metric for fair time-aware compar-
isons of different solutions, and offering a tuning algorithm
to leverage the effects of training data distribution. Miller et
al. [36] identified temporal sample consistency (equivalent to
our constraint C1), but not C2 or C3—which are fundamen-
tal (§4.4); moreover, they considered the test period to be a
uniform time slot, whereas we take time decay into account.
Roy et al. [45] questioned the use of recent or older malware
as training objects and the performance degradation in test-
ing real-world object ratios; however, most experiments were
designed without considering time, reducing the reliability of
their conclusions. While past work highlighted some sources
of experimental bias [1, 2, 36, 45], it also gave little considera-
tion to classifiers’ aims: different scenarios may have different
goals (not necessarily maximizing F1), hence in our work we
show the effects of different training settings on performance
goals and propose an algorithm to properly tune a classifier
accordingly (§4.3).
Other works from the ML literature investigate imbalanced
datasets and highlighted how training and testing ratios can
influence the results of an algorithm [9, 25, 55]. However, not
coming from the security domain, these studies [9, 25, 55]
focus only on some aspects of spatial bias and do not consider
temporal bias. Indeed, concept drift is less problematic in
some applications (e.g., image and text classification) than in
Android malware [26]. Fawcett [16] focuses on challenges
in spam detection, one of which resembles spatial bias; no
solution is provided, whereas we introduce C3 to this end
and demonstrate how its violation inflates performance (§4.4).
Torralba and Efros [52] discuss the problem of dataset bias
in computer vision, distinct from our security setting where
there are fewer benchmarks; moreover in images the nega-
tive class (e.g., “not cat”) can grow arbitrarily, which is less
likely in the malware context. Moreno-Torres et al. [38] sys-
tematize different drifts, and mention sample-selection bias;
while this resembles spatial bias, they do not propose any so-
lution/experiments for its impact on ML performance. Other
related work underlines the importance of choosing appropri-
ate performance metrics to avoid an incorrect interpretation
of the results (e.g., ROC curves are misleading in an imbal-
anced dataset [14, 24]). In this paper, we take imbalance into
account, and we propose actionable constraints and metrics
with tool support to evaluate performance decay of classifiers
over time.
Summary. Several studies of bias exist and have motivated
our research. However, none of them address the entire prob-
lem in the context of evolving data (where the i.i.d. assump-
tion does not hold anymore). Constraint C1, introduced by
Miller et al. [36], is by itself insufficient to eliminate bias. This
is evident from the original evaluation in MAMADROID [33],
which enforces only C1. The evaluation in §4.4 clarifies why
our novel constraints C2 and C3 are fundamental, and shows
how our AUT metric can effectively reveal the true perfor-
mance of algorithms, providing counter-intuitive results.
8 Availability
We make TESSERACT’s code and data available to the
research community to promote the adoption of a sound
and unbiased evaluation of classifiers. The TESSERACT
project website with instructions to request access is at
https://s2lab.kcl.ac.uk/projects/tesseract/. We will also main-
tain an updated list of publicly available security-related
datasets with timestamped objects.
9 Conclusions
We have identified novel temporal and spatial bias in the An-
droid domain and proposed novel constraints, metrics and
tuning to address such issues. We have built and released
TESSERACT as an open-source tool that integrates our meth-
ods. We have shown how TESSERACT can reveal the real per-
formance of malware classifiers that remain hidden in wrong
experimental settings in a non-stationary context. TESSER-
ACT is fundamental for the correct evaluation and comparison
of different solutions, in particular when considering miti-
gation strategies for time decay. We are currently working
on integrating a time-varying percentage of malware in our
framework to model still more realistic scenarios, and on how
to use the slope of the performance decay curve to better
differentiate algorithms with similar AUT.
We envision that future work on Android malware classifi-
cation will use TESSERACT to produce realistic, comparable
and unbiased results. Moreover, we also encourage the secu-
rity community to adopt TESSERACT to evaluate the impact
of temporal and spatial bias in other security domains where
concept drift still needs to be quantified.
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A Appendix
A.1 Algorithm Hyperparameters
We hereby report the details of the hyperparameters used to
replicate ALG1, ALG2 and DL.
We replicate the settings and experiments of ALG1 [4]
(linear SVM with C=1) and ALG2 [33] (package mode and
RF with 101 trees and max depth of 64) as described in the
respective papers [4, 33], successfully reproducing the pub-
lished results. Since on our dataset the ALG1 performance
is slightly lower (around 0.91 10-fold F1), we also reproduce
the experiment on their same dataset [4], achieving their orig-
inal performance of about 0.94 10-fold F1. We have used
SCIKIT-LEARN, with sklearn.svm.LinearSVC for ALG1 and
sklearn.ensemble.RandomForestClassifier for ALG2.
We then follow the guidelines in [22] to re-implement
DL with KERAS. The features given as initial input to the
neural network are the same as ALG1. We replicated the best-
performing neural network architecture of [22], by training
with 10 epochs and batch size equal to 1,000. To perform
the training optimization, we used the stochastic gradient
descent class keras.optimizers.SGD with the following pa-
rameters: lr=0.1, momentum=0.0, decay=0.0, nesterov=False.
Some low-level details of the hyperparameter optimization
were missing from the original paper [22]; we managed to
obtain slightly higher F1 performance in 10-fold setting (§4.4)
likely because they have performed hyperparameter optimiza-
tion on the Accuracy metric [8]—which is misleading in im-
balanced datasets [5] where one class is prevalent (goodware,
in Android).
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A.2 Symbol table
Table 4 is a legend of the main symbols used throughout this
paper to improve readability.
Symbol Description
gw Short version of goodware.
mw Short version of malware.
ML Short version of Machine Learning.
D Labeled dataset with malware (mw) and goodware (gw).
Tr Training dataset.
W Size of the time window of the training set (e.g., 1 year).
Ts Testing dataset.
S Size of the time window of the testing set (e.g., 2 years).
∆ Size of the test time-slots for time-aware evaluations (e.g.,months).
AUT( f ,N)
Area Under Time, a new metric we define to measure perfor-
mance over time decay and compare different solutions (§4.2).
It is always computed with respect to a performance function f
(e.g., F1-Score) and N is the number of time units considered
(e.g., 24 months)
σˆ Estimated percentage of malware (mw) in the wild.
ϕ Percentage of malware (mw) in the training set.
δ Percentage of malware (mw) in the testing set.
P Performance target of the tuning algorithm in §4.3; it can beF1-Score, Precision (Pr) or Recall (Rec).
ϕ∗P
Percentage of malware (mw) in the training set, to improve
performance P on the malware (mw) class (§4.3).
E Error rate (§4.3).
Emax Maximum error rate when searching ϕ∗P (§4.3).
Θ Model learned after training a classifier.
L Labeling cost.
Q Quarantine cost.
P Performance; depending on the context, it will refer to AUTwith F1 or Pr or Rec.
Table 4: Symbol table.
A.3 Cumulative Plots for Time Decay
Figure 10 shows the cumulative performance plot defined in
§4.2. This is the cumulative version of Figure 5.
A.4 Delay Strategies
We discuss more background details on the mitigation strate-
gies adopted in Section 5.
Incremental retraining. Incremental retraining is an ap-
proach that tends towards an “ideal” performance P∗: all test
objects are periodically labeled manually, and the new knowl-
edge introduced to the classifier via retraining. More formally,
the performance of month mi is determined from the predic-
tions of a model Θ trained on: Tr∪{m0,m1, ...,mi−1}, where
{m0,m1, ...,mi−1} are testing objects, which are manually la-
beled. The dashed gray line represents the F1-Score without
incremental retraining (i.e., stationary training). Although in-
cremental retraining generally achieves optimal performance
throughout the whole test period, it also incurs the highest
labeling cost L.
Active learning. Active learning is a field of machine learn-
ing that studies query strategies to select a small number of
testing points close to the decision boundaries, that, if in-
cluded in the training set, are the most relevant for updating
the classifier. For example, in a linear SVM the slope of the
decision boundary greatly depends on the points that are clos-
est to it, the support vectors [8]; all the points further from the
SVM decision boundary are classified with higher confidence,
hence have limited effect on the slope of the hyperplane.
We evaluate the impact of one of the most popular active
learning strategies: uncertainty sampling [36, 46]. This query
strategy selects the most points the classifier is least certain
about, and uses them for retraining; we apply it in a time-
aware scenario, and choose a percentage of objects to retrain
per month. The intuition is that the most uncertain elements
are the ones that may be indicative of concept drift, and new,
correct knowledge about them may better inform the decision
boundaries. The number of objects to label depends on the
user’s available resources for labeling.
More formally, in binary classification uncertainty sam-
pling gives a score x∗LC (where LC stands for Least Confident)
to each sample [46]; this score is defined as follows4:
x∗LC := argmaxx{1−PΘ(yˆ|x)} (6)
where yˆ := argmaxyPΘ(y|x) is the class label with the highest
posterior probability according to classifier Θ. In a binary
classification task, the maximum uncertainty for an object is
achieved when its prediction probability equal to 0.5 for both
classes (i.e., equal probability of being goodware or malware).
The test objects are sorted by descending order of uncertainty
x∗LC, and the top-n most uncertain are selected to be labeled
for retraining the classifier.
Depending on the percentage of manually labeled points,
each scenario corresponds to a different labeling cost L. The
labeling cost L is known a priori since it is user specified.
Classification with rejection. Malware evolves rapidly
over time, so if the classifier is not up to date, the decision
region may no longer be representative of new objects. An-
other approach, orthogonal to active learning, is to include a
reject option as a possible classifier outcome [17, 26]. This
discards the most uncertain predictions to a quarantine area
for manual inspection at a future date. At the cost of rejecting
some objects, the overall performance of the classifier (on the
remaining objects) increases. The intuition is that in this way
only high confidence decisions are taken into account. Again,
although performance P improves, there is a quarantine cost
Q associated with it; in this case, unlike active learning, the
cost is not known a priori because, in traditional classifica-
tion with rejection, a threshold on the classifier confidence is
applied [17, 26].
4In multi-class classification, there is a query strategy based on the entropy
of the prediction scores array; in binary classification, the entropy-based
query strategy is proven to be equivalent to the “least confident” [46].
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Figure 10: Performance time decay with cumulative estimate for ALG1, ALG2 and DL. Testing distribution has δ = 10%
malware, and training distribution has ϕ= 10% malware.
A.5 TESSERACT Implementation
We have implemented our constraints, metrics, and algorithms
as a Python library named TESSERACT, designed to integrate
easily with common workflows. In particular, the API design
of TESSERACT is heavily inspired by and fully compatible
with SCIKIT-LEARN [39] and KERAS [10]; as a result, many of
the conventions and workflows in TESSERACT will be famil-
iar to users of these libraries. Here we present an overview of
the library’s core modules while further details of the design
can be found in [40].
temporal.py While machine learning libraries com-
monly involve working with a set of predictors X and
a set of output variables y, TESSERACT extends this
concept to include an array of datetime objects t.
This allows for operations such as the time-aware parti-
tioning of datasets (e.g., time_aware_partition() and
time_aware_train_test_split()) while respecting tem-
poral constraints C1 and C2.
spatial.py This module allows the user to alter the
proportion of the positive class in a given dataset.
downsample_set() can be used to simulate the natural class
distribution σˆ expected during deployment or to tune the
performance of the model by over-representing a class dur-
ing training. To this end we provide an implementation of
Algorithm 1 for finding the optimal training proportion ϕ∗
(search_optimal_train_ratio()). This module can also
assert that constraint C3 (§4.1) has not been violated.
metrics.py As TESSERACT aims to encourage compara-
ble and reproducible evaluations, we include functions for
visualizing classifier assessments and deriving metrics such
as the accuracy or total errors from slices of a time-aware
evaluation. Importantly we also include aut() for computing
the AUT for a given metric (F1, Precision, AUC, etc.) over a
given time period.
evaluation.py Here we include the predict() and
fit_predict_update() functions that accept a classifier,
dataset and set of parameters (as defined in §4.1) and return
the results of a time-aware evaluation performed across the
chosen periods.
selection.py and rejection.py For extending the evalua-
tion to testing model update strategies, these modules pro-
vide hooks for novel query and reject strategies to be easily
plugged into the evaluation cycle. We already implement
many of the methods discussed in §5 and include them with
our release. We hope this modular approach lowers the bar
for follow-up research in these areas.
A.6 Summary of Datasets Evaluated by Prior Work
As a reference, Table 5 reports the composition of the dataset
used in our paper (1st row) and of the datasets used for
experimentally biased evaluations in prior work ALG1 [4],
ALG2 [33], and DL [22] (2nd and 3rd row). In this paper, we
always evaluate ALG1, ALG2 and DL with the dataset in the
first row (more details in §2.3 and Figure 1), because we have
built it to allow experiments without spatio-temporal bias by
enforcing constraints C1, C2 and C3. Details on experimental
settings that caused spatio-temporal bias in prior work are
described in §3 and §4. We never use the datasets of prior
work [4, 22, 33] in our experiments.
Work Apps Date Range # Objects Total Violations
TESSERACT
(this work)
Benign
Jan 2014 - Dec 2016
116,993 116,993
-
Malicious 12,735 12,735
[4], [22]
Benign
Aug 2010 - Oct 2012
123,453 123,453
C1
Malicious 5,560 5,560
[33]
Benign
Apr 2013 - Nov 2013 5,879
8,447
(C1)
C2
C3
Mar 2016 2,568
Malicious
Oct 2010 - Aug 2012 5,560
35,493
Jan 2013 - Jun 2013 6,228
Jun 2013 - Mar 2014 15,417
Jan 2015 - Jun 2015 5,314
Jan 2016 - May 2016 2,974
Table 5: Summary of datasets composition used by our paper
(1st row) and by prior work [4, 22, 33] (2nd and 3rd row).
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